WATTS, J.
This attorney discipline proceeding concerns a Maryland lawyer who solicited for sexual acts a person whom the lawyer believed to be under the age of consent.
Robert John Greenleaf ("Greenleaf"), Respondent, while serving as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, used the Internet to solicit for sexual acts a law enforcement officer who was posing as a fourteen-year-old or fifteen-year-old girl. Greenleaf's actions came to the attention of the Attorney Grievance Commission ("the Commission"), Petitioner.
On March 14, 2013, in this Court, Bar Counsel filed a "Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action" against Greenleaf, charging him with violating Maryland Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct ("MLRPC") 8.4 (Misconduct). On March 18, 2013, this Court assigned this attorney discipline proceeding to the Honorable Paul M. Bowman ("the hearing judge") of the Circuit Court for Kent County.
On July 25, 2013, the hearing judge conducted a hearing. On September 19, 2013, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Greenleaf had violated MLRPC 8.4(b) (Criminal Act), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC).
On April 8, 2014, we heard oral argument. For the below reasons, we disbar Greenleaf.
In his opinion, the hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize.
On November 8, 1979, this Court admitted Greenleaf to the Bar of Maryland. Between 1987 and 2004, Greenleaf served as an Assistant State's Attorney for Dorchester County, an Assistant State's Attorney for Caroline County, an interim State's Attorney for Caroline County, and a Senior Assistant State's Attorney for Dorchester County. On January 6, 2004, Greenleaf became the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals. Greenleaf's office
On March 8, 2010, Detective Sergeant Louis Gary Yamin ("DS Yamin") of the Baltimore Police Department was working undercover for the Cyber and Electronic Crimes Unit. DS Yamin had a Yahoo Messenger account with the username "ravens_girl2003," which was connected to a Yahoo profile for a female named "Beth." On March 8, 2010, as "Beth," DS Yamin entered a Yahoo Messenger chat room entitled "Maryland Romance." In the chat room, a person with the username "delmarvan19901" initiated a private chat with "Beth," who almost immediately sent the message "14/f/balto. md[,]" which is Internet language for identifying oneself as a fourteen-year-old female in the Baltimore area. "delmarvan19901" began discussing sexual topics. "Beth" sent "delmarvan19901" two photographs that depicted a young teenage girl. "delmarvan19901" sent a photograph of himself.
In addition to sending the two photographs, "Beth" e-mailed "delmarvan19901," who sent a reply e-mail. DS Yamin learned that Greenleaf was using the IP address from which "delmarvan19901" had sent the reply e-mail. The IP address belonged to the Maryland Judiciary. DS Yamin matched the photograph that "delmarvan19901" had sent with a photograph of Greenleaf from the Motor Vehicle Administration's database. Thus, it was established that while the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals, Greenleaf used a State-owned computer in the Robert C. Murphy Courts of Appeal Building to communicate with "Beth."
Greenleaf believed that "Beth" was a fourteen-year-old or a fifteen-year-old girl.
On approximately one hundred fifty separate dates, Greenleaf and "Beth" e-mailed and/or chatted with each other. On nearly half of those dates, Greenleaf used his computer at the Robert C. Murphy Courts of Appeal Building to communicate with "Beth."
Greenleaf's and "Beth's" conversations were "consistently sexually explicit." For example, Greenleaf asked "Beth" to describe her pubic hair, sexual history, bra size, and whether she was taking birth control.
In December 2010, on four separate occasions, Greenleaf sent "Beth" links to pornographic videos. Greenleaf last communicated with "Beth" on January 25, 2011. Finally, in January 2011, Greenleaf was arrested and was placed on administrative leave. On April 1, 2011, Greenleaf was permitted to retire from his position as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error the hearing judge's findings of fact, and reviews without deference the hearing judge's conclusions of law. See Md. R. 16-759(b)(2)(B) ("The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Reno, 436 Md. 504, 508, 83 A.3d 781, 783 (2014) ("[T]his Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge's findings of fact[.]"); Md. R. 16-759(b)(1) ("The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge's conclusions of law."). This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer violated the MLRPC. See Md. R. 16-757(b) ("The [Commission] has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.").
The Commission does not except to any of the hearing judge's findings of fact. Greenleaf excepts to the hearing judge's finding that he believed that "Beth" was a fourteen-year-old or a fifteen-year-old girl.
We overrule Greenleaf's exception, as the hearing judge did not clearly err, or err at all, in finding that Greenleaf believed that "Beth" was a fourteen-year-old or a fifteen-year-old girl. The record unequivocally demonstrates that "Beth": (1) identified herself as a fourteen-year-old girl; (2) repeatedly referred to her age; (3) stated that she was a high school student; and (4) sent two photographs that depicted a young teenage girl.
In addition to excepting to certain findings of fact, in an apparent attempt to establish mitigating circumstances, Greenleaf alleges additional facts: (1) he performed well as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals; (2) at the time of his misconduct, he had just returned from sick leave, and was "trouble[ed]" at work because he had been transferred to a secluded office that was away from other employees; (3) he completed "mental health counseling" as a condition of probation; (4) he "suffered ignominy" because of his misconduct; and (5) he "has shown remorse" for his misconduct. The hearing judge did not find that Greenleaf: (1) performed well as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals; (2) suffered from any personal or emotional problems; (3) attempted any kind of rehabilitation; (4) endured any embarrassment; or (5) showed any remorse. As this Court stated in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Davy, 435 Md. 674, 694, 80 A.3d 322, 333-34 (2013):
(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the hearing judge neither credited nor rejected the alleged facts.
The Commission does not except to any of the hearing judge's conclusions of law. Greenleaf excepts to the hearing judge's conclusion that he violated CR § 3-324 (Sexual Solicitation of Minor).
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects[.]" MLRPC 8.4(b).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge's conclusion that Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(b) by violating CR § 3-324(b).
We reject Greenleaf's ludicrous contention that he did not violate CR § 3-324(b) because he did not intend to violate CR § 3-307 by immediately engaging in intercourse with "Beth" "then and there[,]" but instead was "prepar[ing] for the future[.]" (Emphasis in original). CR § 3-324(b) simply requires that, at the time of the solicitation, a person intends to violate CR § 3-307 at some point in the future — even if the person does not intend to immediately violate CR § 3-307.
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]" MLRPC 8.4(c).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge's conclusion that Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by using his computer at the Robert C. Murphy Courts of Appeal Building to communicate with "Beth." Greenleaf's use of the computer in the workplace during work time to violate CR § 3-324(b) constituted conduct involving dishonesty. The Court of Special Appeals would neither expect, condone, nor excuse the use of a court computer for the purpose of solicitation of a minor for sex. Such egregious conduct in violation of a criminal statute designed to protect children clearly involved dishonesty as to Greenleaf's appropriate use of time and equipment. Greenleaf could not have reasonably expected to disclose this activity and remain employed as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court, or, for that matter, employed in any capacity by the Court. That said, a lawyer may, at times, make incidental personal use of computer equipment in the workplace without violating MLRPC 8.4(c). Use of computer equipment on multiple occasions — for nearly half of the one hundred fifty dates spanning almost eleven months, from March 8, 2010 through January 25, 2011 — to commit the crime of solicitation a minor
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]" MLRPC 8.4(d). Generally, a lawyer violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer's conduct negatively "impacts ... the public's perception ... of the courts or legal profession." Reno, 436 Md. at 509, 83 A.3d at 784 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge's conclusion that Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(d). Greenleaf solicited for sexual acts a person whom he believed to be a fourteen-year-old or fifteen-year-old girl. Greenleaf was arrested and charged, and entered an Alford plea to a charge of attempting to violate CR § 11-203. Greenleaf's misconduct
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... violate ... the" MLRPC. MLPRC 8.4(a).
Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge's conclusion that Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(a). As discussed above, Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).
The Commission recommends that we disbar Greenleaf. Greenleaf asks that we reprimand him, "or, at worst," indefinitely suspend him from the practice of law with the right to apply for reinstatement after one year.
This Court sanctions a lawyer not "to punish the" lawyer, but instead "to protect the public and the public's confidence in the legal profession[.]" Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Worthy, 436 Md. 633, 643, 84 A.3d 113, 119 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court protects the public by: (1) "deterr[ing]" other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer who is "unfit to continue" to practice law. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 649, 72 A.3d 567, 577 (2013) (citation omitted).
In determining an appropriate sanction, this Court considers: "(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards") at III.C.3.0 (1992) (paragraph breaks omitted).
ABA Standards at III.C.9.22 (paragraph breaks omitted).
ABA Standards at III.C.9.32 (paragraph breaks omitted).
This Court has disbarred lawyers who violated MLRPC 8.4(b) by committing crimes that adversely reflected on the lawyers' fitness to continue to practice law, even if: (1) the lawyers did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c); and (2) this Court noted few (if any) aggravating factors. In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 261, 249-50, 812 A.2d 981, 1002, 995-96 (2002), without noting any aggravating factors, this Court disbarred a lawyer who committed the crime of obstructing and hindering a police officer by helping a murder suspect flee the country. Similarly, in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Painter, 356 Md. 293, 307, 305, 739 A.2d 24, 32, 31 (1999), this Court disbarred a lawyer who committed the crimes of battery and illegally transporting a handgun. The lawyer had abused his spouse and child. See id. at 305, 739 A.2d at 31. This Court stated: "[D]omestic violence is a serious problem in our society." Id. at 302, 739 A.2d at 29 (citation omitted). This Court noted one aggravating factor: a prior disciplinary offense, for which the lawyer received "a private reprimand[.]" Id. at 301, 739 A.2d at 29.
In another case in which a lawyer committed a crime, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Dechowitz, 358 Md. 184, 193, 186, 191, 747 A.2d 657, 661, 658, 660 (2000), without noting any aggravating factors, this Court disbarred a lawyer who committed the crime of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, and thus "was a drug dealer." In Dechowitz, id. at 192, 193, 747 A.2d at 661, this Court accepted the lawyer's concession that he had violated MLRPC 8.4(c), and stated that possession of drugs with the intent to distribute "generally results in disbarment."
Here, as to the duty violated and Greenleaf's mental state, Greenleaf intentionally solicited for sexual acts "Beth," whom he believed to be a fourteen-year-old or fifteen-year-old girl. In other words, Greenleaf deliberately preyed on, and intended to violate, a person whom he believed to be under the age of consent.
As to the potential injury caused by Greenleaf's misconduct, Greenleaf could have solicited a minor for sexual acts or sexually abused a minor if "Beth" had actually been a minor. In other words, Greenleaf had the mindset to solicit, violate, mentally scar, and destroy the innocence of a child. In this case, no injury actually occurred due to Greenleaf's misconduct only because "Beth" was not in reality a minor capable of being injured by Greenleaf.
Eight aggravating factors accompany Greenleaf's misconduct. First, Greenleaf obviously had the selfish motive of sexual gratification. Second and third, Greenleaf engaged in a pattern of egregious misconduct and committed multiple offenses by communicating with "Beth" on approximately one hundred fifty separate dates. Fourth, Greenleaf has refused to acknowledge his misconduct's wrongful nature; indeed,
Only one mitigating factor accompanies Greenleaf's misconduct: the absence of a prior disciplinary record. We reject Greenleaf's contention that his misconduct is mitigated by such circumstances as the lack of: (1) in-person contact between himself and "Beth"; (2) child pornography; and (3) misconduct that arose out of representation of a client. A lawyer's misconduct is not mitigated by the lawyer's refraining from engaging in even more egregious and inappropriate misconduct. Similarly, we reject Greenleaf's contention that his misconduct is mitigated by other penalties in the form of being placed on probation and leaving his position as the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals. Receiving a sentence and losing one's job are the natural and foreseeable consequences of committing a crime, and crimes against children are among the most heinous crimes of all. Here, Greenleaf did not lose his job; he was permitted to retire. Greenleaf's misconduct is not mitigated by his being placed on probation or leaving his job.
We are more than satisfied that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Greenleaf's egregious misconduct. Greenleaf deliberately solicited and preyed on a person whom he believed to be under the age of consent. Greenleaf had the intent to violate, mentally scar, and destroy the innocence of a child. Greenleaf is a sexual predator who is a danger to the public and is "unfit to continue" to practice law. Gerace, 433 Md. at 649, 72 A.3d at 577 (citation omitted).
Sheinbein, Painter, and Dechowitz lead to the inescapable conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Greenleaf's egregious misconduct. If disbarment is the appropriate sanction for an obstructionist, a domestic abuser, and a drug dealer, then disbarment certainly is also the appropriate sanction for a sexual predator like Greenleaf. The solicitation of minors is a deplorable crime that cannot be tolerated in our society, much less tolerated when committed by an attorney, employed by the Judiciary and using State-owned computer equipment to commit the crime in the workplace. Cf. Painter, 356 Md. at 302, 739 A.2d at 29 ("[D]omestic violence is a serious problem in our society." (Citation omitted)).
Our conclusion that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Greenleaf's egregious misconduct is unassailable, given
Greenleaf's reliance on Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Childress, 364 Md. 48, 770 A.2d 685 (2001) is untenable. In Childress, id. at 64, 67, 52, 770 A.2d at 695, 696, 688, this Court adopted the Commission's recommendation by indefinitely suspending from the practice of law, with the right to apply for reinstatement after one year, a lawyer who violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by using the Internet to solicit minors for sex.
To be perfectly clear, we caution that Childress does not stand for the proposition that, generally, solicitation of a minor merits a sanction that is less than disbarment. "The severity of the sanction depends on the circumstances of each case... and any mitigating factors." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bocchino, 435 Md. 505, 536, 80 A.3d 222, 240 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in Childress, this Court stated: (1) "we must ... consider certain circumstances... that mitigate the sanction[,]" Childress, 364 Md. at 65, 770 A.2d at 695; and (2) an indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction "[i]n light of all of the circumstances, including the recommendation of" the Commission. Id. at 67, 770 A.2d at 696.
For a myriad of critical reasons, we distinguish Childress from the instant attorney discipline proceeding. First, in Childress, the lawyer did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation); by contrast, here, Greenleaf violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by using his computer at the Robert C. Murphy Courts of Appeal Building to solicit
Fifth — and perhaps most importantly — in Childress, id. at 64, 770 A.2d at 694, although this Court held that the lawyer violated a Virginia statute that criminalized solicitation of minors,
Although Greenleaf does not expressly rely on either case, we discuss and distinguish Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 329-31, 786 A.2d 763, 772-73 (2001) and Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 655, 521 A.2d 746, 747-48 (1987), in which this Court adopted the Commission's recommendations by indefinitely suspending lawyers who violated MLRPC 8.4(b) (or the predecessor to MLRPC 8.4(b)). In Thompson, 367 Md. at 329, 786 A.2d at 772, the lawyer stalked a thirteen-year-old boy. This Court noted only one aggravating factor: vulnerability of the victim. See id. at 331, 786 A.2d at 773. This Court noted that the following four mitigating factors "prevented disbarment":
In sum, we agree. Greenleaf is, indeed, a sexual predator who is a danger to the public and is "unfit to continue" to practice law. Gerace, 433 Md. at 649, 72 A.3d at 577 (citation omitted). For the above reasons, we disbar Greenleaf.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, although Greenleaf did not make a false statement, the record demonstrates that his conduct involved dishonesty, as Greenleaf was certainly not candid with his employer about his extensive nefarious activities in the workplace. Indeed, Greenleaf, on nearly one half of one hundred fifty occasions, used his employer's computer to commit a crime while holding himself out to his employer to be an employee who was using his time to perform the duties of the employer in the workplace.